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THE RETURN OF THE PLAGUE: INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
AFTER REGENERON V. MERUS
Matthew Avery,† Matthew Kempf,‡ & Amy Liang§
In July 2017, the Federal Circuit decided Regeneron
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Merus, where a split panel upheld the district
court’s decision to infer prosecution misconduct by Regeneron based
on its subsequent litigation misconduct during the patent case, thus
holding its patent unenforceable based on the doctrine of inequitable
conduct. The decision raises new questions regarding the relevance
of litigation misconduct to the unenforceability of a patent, which has
traditionally been determined based upon evidence of misconduct
before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (i.e., pre-litigation
misconduct). The Regeneron decision also raises new questions
regarding the standard of proof needed to establish inequitable
conduct as a defense to patent infringement. In 2011, the Federal
Circuit raised the bar for proving inequitable conduct in Therasense,
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., where an en banc panel held that
clear and convincing evidence was needed to prove intent to deceive
the USPTO, and that intent to deceive cannot be inferred by proving
other elements of the defense. Prior to Therasense, claims of
inequitable conduct were once so prevalent that the court wrote that
the defense had “become an absolute plague” on patent litigation. By
indicating that it is willing to consider litigation misconduct to infer a
finding of inequitable conduct, the Federal Circuit appears to have
expanded the scope of the doctrine, which may encourage defendants
to raise inequitable conduct as a defense. If subsequent cases follow
this expanded theory, the consequences could be far-reaching,
exposing patent holders to a new wave of inequitable conduct
charges. This Article examines the effect of Regeneron on the
inequitable conduct defense and further discusses considerations for
practitioners in light of the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Regeneron.
† Mr. Avery is a Senior Associate at Baker Botts LLP in San Francisco, California, and an
Adjunct Professor at U.C. Hastings College of Law.
‡ Mr. Kempf is an Associate at Baker Botts LLP in Palo Alto, California.
§ Ms. Liang is an Associate at Baker Botts LLP in Palo Alto, California.

328

2018]

THE RETURN OF THE PLAGUE

329

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 330
I. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT UNDER THERASENSE ........................ 332
II.
THE EVOLUTION OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AFTER
THERASENSE.................................................................................. 335
A. But-For Materiality After Therasense ............................... 336
B.

Specific Intent to Deceive After Therasense ...................... 340

C.

State of the Law Just Before Regeneron ............................ 343

III.
REGENERON AND THE POTENTIAL RETREAT FROM
THERASENSE.................................................................................. 344
A. The Regeneron District Court Decision ............................ 344
B.

The Regeneron Federal Circuit Opinion ........................... 346
1.

Materiality..................................................................... 347

2.

Intent to Deceive ........................................................... 348

3.

Judge Newman’s Dissent ............................................... 349

4.

The Regeneron Majority Versus Dissent on Aptix Decision..
...................................................................................... 350

IV.

THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF REGENERON AT DISTRICT COURT
........................................................................................ 352
V.
THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF REGENERON: TIPS FOR
PRACTITIONERS ............................................................................ 353
A. Disclosures During Prosecution ....................................... 354
B.

Post-Allowance Disclosures ............................................. 356

C.

Pre-Litigation Diligence ................................................... 359

D.

Strategic Assertion ........................................................... 360

CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 361

330

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 34

INTRODUCTION
Under the patent law doctrine of inequitable conduct, a patent
can be held unenforceable if a court finds that the patentee obtained
the patent by engaging in improper conduct before the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO).1 Once referred to as an “absolute
plague” on the patent system by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, inequitable conduct was routinely asserted by defendants in
patent cases.2 Common examples of such conduct include making
false statements to the patent office or intentionally withholding
material information during prosecution.3 In 2011, the Federal Circuit
issued an en banc decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson &
Company, setting forth a heightened standard for proving inequitable
conduct.4 To prove inequitable conduct under Therasense, a patent
defendant must show that the patent applicant (1) withheld or
misrepresented “but-for” material information, and (2) acted with
specific intent to deceive the USPTO. A critical aspect of the
Therasense holding is that specific intent must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence, and that such intent cannot be inferred merely
because material information was withheld or misrepresented.5 Since
this decision was handed down, use of the inequitable conduct
defense in patent litigation has sharply dropped.6
However, just six years later, the Federal Circuit issued an
opinion that appears to have weakened the foundations of the
Therasense standard. In July 2017, Chief Judge Prost issued a
precedential opinion in Regeneron Pharmaceuticals v. Merus N.V.,
1. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
2. Id. at 1289 (where the court cited to a study that estimated eighty percent of patent
infringement cases included allegations of inequitable conduct, and agreed that the defense “has
been overplayed, is appearing in nearly every patent suit, and is cluttering up the patent
system.”); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has
become an absolute plague.”); Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289 (“Left unfettered, the inequitable
conduct doctrine has plagued not only the courts but also the entire patent system.”). Note,
however, that the en banc court in Therasense heightened the standard for finding inequitable
conduct, as discussed in more detail in Part II, infra.
3. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“To prove inequitable conduct in the prosecution of a patent, [the defendant]
must have provided evidence of affirmative misrepresentations of a material fact, failure to
disclose material information, or submission of false material information, coupled with an
intent to deceive.”).
4. 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
5. Id. at 1276.
6. Ryan Davis, Inequitable Conduct a Dying Defense 2 Years Post-Therasense, LAW360
(May 23, 2013, 9:13 PM), http://bit.do/law360_inequitableconduct.
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which affirmed a finding of inequitable conduct without a finding of
specific intent as was required by Therasense.7 In Regeneron, the
patentee failed to disclose several prior art references to the USPTO
during prosecution of the patent at issue, and the district court found
these withheld references to be “but-for” material information.8
However, the district court did not specifically determine whether the
patentee acted with a specific intent to deceive the USPTO, but rather
inferred intent to deceive primarily based on misconduct during
discovery in the patent litigation proceedings.9 Based on this
inference, the district court held the patent unenforceable.10
Notwithstanding its prior holding in Therasense, that specific intent
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the Regeneron district court decision on appeal.11
This Article explores the effects of Regeneron on inequitable
conduct challenges, and whether it heralds a return of the “plague” to
the patent system. Part I provides an overview of the doctrine of
inequitable conduct under the Therasense standard, which requires a
showing that the patent holder’s conduct was both material to
patentability and done with the specific intent to deceive the patent
office. Part II discusses several post-Therasense cases that illustrate
how district courts and the Federal Circuit have applied the
Therasense standard. Part III discusses how Regeneron appears to
retreat from the heightened standard previously set by the Federal
Circuit in Therasense. Part IV discusses several post-Regeneron cases
that illustrate its impact on patent litigation. Finally, Part V provides
strategic considerations for prosecution and litigation counsel for
avoiding charges of inequitable conduct.
7. Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017) [hereinafter
Regeneron II].
8. Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus B.V., 144 F. Supp. 3d 530, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
[hereinafter Regeneron I], aff’d sub nom. Regeneron II.
9. Regeneron I, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 561, 595-96 (“An inference of intent to deceive is
appropriate where the applicant engages in ‘a pattern of lack of candor’ including where the
applicant repeatedly makes factual representations ‘contrary to the true information he had in his
possession.’” Regeneron had shown “a long pattern of litigation choices that [had] caused delay,
inefficient use of resources, and diversion from the merits.” “The Court therefore infers that Drs.
Smeland and Murphy together knew of each of the Withheld References, knew they were
material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold them. In short, they acted with the specific
intent to deceive the patent office. The Court finds that this is ‘the single most reasonable
inference able to be drawn from the evidence.’”).
10. Id. at 596.
11. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1364 (“[T]he district court did not abuse its discretion by
drawing an adverse inference of Regeneron’s specific intent to deceive the PTO. Thus, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in holding the ‘018 patent unenforceable due to
Regeneron’s inequitable conduct.”).
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INEQUITABLE CONDUCT UNDER THERASENSE

Inequitable conduct is an affirmative defense in patent litigation,
in which the defendant asserts that the patentee obtained its patent
through improper conduct before the USPTO.12 This judiciallycreated doctrine originated from a trio of Supreme Court cases
dealing with the equitable doctrine of unclean hands.13 Prior to the
development of the inequitable conduct doctrine, a patentee who had
engaged in egregious misconduct, and thus came to the court with
“unclean hands,” would often be denied an injunction against the
alleged infringer.14 The modern inequitable conduct defense is
tantamount to an accusation of fraud on the USPTO, and the
consequences are much more severe. If the defense is proven, the
entire patent (and possibly all related patents in the same family) can
be held unenforceable, even if the claims of the patent are otherwise
valid.15 In fact, a finding of inequitable conduct may jeopardize a
company’s entire patent portfolio, and may even give rise to
additional antitrust and unfair competition claims.16 The effects of
such a finding are so severe that the Federal Circuit, in Therasense,
referred to the doctrine as an “atomic bomb,” and elevated the
standard of what must be shown to prove the defense.17
As obtaining a patent is an ex parte procedure, all persons
substantively involved in the prosecution of the patent application
owe a duty of candor to the USPTO to disclose all known information

12. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1285.
13. Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1993); Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto.
Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
14. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287.
15. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir.
1988); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex. Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see, e.g.,
Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 808-12 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Inequitable conduct committed in prosecution of one patent may render related patents
unenforceable as well. Generally, an “intimate relation” between the patents or an “immediate
and necessary relation” between the inequitable conduct and the second patent is required to
render the second patent unenforceable. See Newell Window Furnishings, Inc. v. Springs
Window Fashions Div., Inc., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1302, 1321, 1328, 1999 WL 1077882 (N.D. Ill.
1999), judgment aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 15 Fed. Appx. 836 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (reversed on factual grounds).
16. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (where
inequitable conduct gave rise to an unfair competition claim); Walker Process Equip., Inc. v.
Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 178 (1965) (where inequitable conduct gave rise to
antitrust action); see also Gregory Michael et al., The New Plague: False Claims Liability Based
on Inequitable Conduct During Patent Prosecution, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 747 (2015).
17. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 (citations omitted).
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material to patentability.18 Acts typically constituting inequitable
conduct include failing to submit material prior art known by the
applicant, failing to explain references written in a foreign language,
misstatements of facts concerning patentability, and misstatements of
inventorship.19 To prove inequitable conduct post-Therasense, an
accused infringer must show by clear and convincing evidence that
the patentee either failed to disclose, misrepresented, or submitted
false information to the patent office (1) that was material to
patentability and (2) with the specific intent to deceive the patent
office.20 Materiality and intent are separate elements that the
defendant must prove, and the Therasense court made clear that the
existence of one cannot provide the basis for inferring the other.21
Proving that a reference was material and not submitted to the
USPTO, for example, does not by itself prove specific intent to
deceive the USPTO.22
Under Therasense, the defendant must show but-for materiality
with respect to the patentee’s omission or misrepresentation to the
patent office.23 Therefore, even when a patentee withholds
information, it only warrants a finding of inequitable conduct if, “butfor” the withholding, the patentee would not have been successful in

18. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (“Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office … [All persons
involved in the patent application owe] a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to
that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this section.”).
19. See McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 913-26
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding inequitable conduct where attorney failed to disclose material
information from related patent application); Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular
Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (inferring intent where applicant “knew
or should have known” that information was relevant to the prosecution); Bruno Indep. Living
Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1350-54 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding
inequitable conduct for failure to cite an FDA proceeding); Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd.,
476 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding inequitable conduct for failing to disclose test
data inconsistent with data disclosed in the specification); Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437
F.3d 1181, 1194-95 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding inequitable conduct where applicant failed to
disclose that declarations from outside experts had been previously employed by the applicant);
Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1229-30 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (inequitable conduct
found where applicant improperly claimed small entity status).
20. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1350-51.
21. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (rejecting the “sliding scale” approach where a court
requires less evidence of intent where a reference is highly material).
22. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (where the court emphasized that clear and convincing evidence of deceptive intent
must be shown as a threshold matter, even if by circumstantial evidence, otherwise a court
“cannot hold the patent unenforceable regardless of the relative equities or how it might balance
them.”).
23. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291.
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prosecuting the claim.24 However, in heightening the standard to butfor materiality, the Therasense court carved out an exception in cases
of affirmative egregious misconduct.25 Where a patent applicant has
engaged in egregious misconduct during prosecution, the materiality
prong is met regardless of whether the claim would have issued.26
Examples of affirmative acts of egregious misconduct include
intentionally filing false affidavits, failing to cure a false affidavit,
and making false representations to the USPTO’s patent appeals
board.27 In heightening the standard for what constitutes “egregious”
conduct, the Therasense court made it clear that merely failing to
disclose prior art references, even those that are “but-for” material,
does not necessarily constitute such misconduct.28
The second element of the inequitable conduct analysis requires
proving that the patentee acted with specific intent to deceive the
USPTO, in that the “evidence must show that the applicant made a
deliberate decision to withhold a known material reference.”29
Specifically, “the defendant must prove that the patentee deliberately
decided to withhold, misrepresent, or falsify information to the
USPTO.”30 This element, which must be proven with clear and
convincing evidence, poses a significant hurdle for defendants, with
courts describing this high burden as an “insurmountable standard”
that “severely limit[s] the ability of district court judges to make
inferences based on the evidence.”31 However, the Therasense court
24. Id. (a prior art reference is “but-for material if the PTO would not have allowed a
claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior art.”).
25. Id. at 1292 (carving out an exception for cases where a patentee “deliberately planned
and carefully executed scheme[s]” to defraud the USPTO).
26. See Regeneron I, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 582, 585 (where the District Court found that,
even though each of the four withheld references met the rigorous “but for” materiality standard,
Regeneron’s conduct during prosecution also amounted to “egregious misconduct,” even
“without need for application of an adverse inference”).
27. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292 (“When the patentee has engaged in affirmative acts of
egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit, the misconduct is
material.”).
28. Id. at 1287, 1290-91 (“As the inequitable conduct doctrine evolved … it came to
embrace a broader scope of misconduct, including not only egregious affirmative acts of
misconduct … but also the mere nondisclosure of information to the PTO.” “This court now
tightens the standards for finding both intent and materiality … [t]he absence of a good faith
explanation for withholding a material reference does not, by itself, prove intent to deceive.”).
29. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172,
1181 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
30. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
31. General Elec. Co. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., 946 F. Supp. 2d 582, 590-91
(N.D. Tex. 2013) (stating that it was reluctantly ruling there was no inequitable conduct for not
disclosing prior art that the court considered to be material because of insufficient evidence of
intent to deceive).
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stated that such intent can be inferred from indirect and circumstantial
evidence, provided that such an inference is “the single most
reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence.”32 The
evidence presented must, therefore, be “sufficient to require a finding
of deceitful intent in the light of all the circumstances.”33 A patentee’s
deceptive intent, therefore, cannot be inferred where multiple
reasonable inferences may be drawn from the same evidence.34
By heightening the standards for both materiality and specific
intent, the Therasense court hoped to “redirect a doctrine that has
been overused to the detriment of the public.”35 However, others
maintain that it has become too difficult to successfully raise an
inequitable conduct defense, and that Therasense improperly restricts
the discretion of district courts.36
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AFTER
THERASENSE

Prior to Therasense, inequitable conduct was raised as a defense
in nearly every patent litigation.37 But the new standard made is so
difficult to prove inequitable conduct that it is now rarely raised as a
defense, and even more rarely successful.38 Proving that a plaintiff
had intentionally withheld prior art from the USPTO has been an
exceedingly burdensome challenge that few defendants have been
able to meet.39 Additionally, under the new heightened standard for
materiality, it has been difficult to show that the patent would not
have issued “but for” the undisclosed reference. Practitioners
described the inequitable conduct defense before Therasense as a
“way to punish patent holders any time they made a mistake during
prosecution, regardless of its significance,” but after Therasense, it
has evolved into a “way to punish people who knowingly deceived
the patent office in a way that affects the outcome of the patent . . . a
much smaller category of conduct.”40
32. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (“Because direct evidence of deceptive intent is rare, a
district court may infer intent from indirect and circumstantial evidence.”) (citing Larson Mfg.
Co. of S.D., Inc. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
33. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 873 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (emphasis added).
34. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290-91.
35. Id. at 1290.
36. Ryan Davis, Inequitable Conduct a Dying Defense 2 Years Post-Therasense, LAW360
(May 23, 2013, 9:13 PM), http://bit.do/law360_inequitableconduct.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.

336

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 34

A. But-For Materiality After Therasense
In Therasense, the Federal Circuit explained that a defendant
must prove “but-for” materiality to support an inequitable conduct
defense because “this doctrine should only be applied in instances
where the patentee’s misconduct resulted in the unfair benefit of
receiving an unwarranted claim.”41 Courts have hewed closely to this
standard and considered not only the technical disclosures that were
withheld or misrepresented, but also the patent examination standards
of the USPTO.42
The most common “but-for” material action is failing to disclose
printed references to the USPTO. For instance, in American Calcar v.
American Honda, the patentee described a prior art reference in the
background section of its patent application, but this background
description failed to discuss critical features disclosed in the prior art
that were similar to features claimed in the patent.43 While the
patentee presented strong evidence against but-for materiality—the
validity of one of the patents-at-issue over the information at issue
had been upheld during an ex parte reexamination at the USPTO—
the district court nonetheless found inequitable conduct.44 The district
court opined that the inventor failed to disclose critical aspects of the
prior art that were relied on to distinguish over the cited prior art, and
also that the “only reasonable inference from the evidence” was that
the patentee had withheld the information with “specific intent to
deceive the PTO.”45 The Federal Circuit affirmed on this same
basis.46 Judge Newman dissented, reasoning that the withheld prior
art could not be but-for material because the USPTO considered the
very same art during reexamination and still allowed the claims.47 The
majority did not address this point, presumably finding that since the
reexamination did not address the two patents for which the finding of
inequitable conduct was made, the reexamination was not relevant.
The appellate court held that the withheld prior art could still be
considered a but-for cause of the patent issuing in the first place
41. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292.
42. See, e.g., Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 768 F.3d 1185, 1192 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. 06CV2433 DMS KSC, 2012 WL
1328640, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2012), aff’d, 768 F.3d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
46. Am. Calcar, 768 F.3d at 1185.
47. Id. at 1192 (Newman, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority had distorted the
Therasense standards, and had “ignored the PTO reexamination, cast[ed] the jury aside, and
generally disregard[ed] the safeguards that this court adopted en banc.”).
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because the USPTO only requires rejections to be supported by a
preponderance of evidence, a much lower standard than the clear and
convincing evidence required to invalidate an issued patent in court.48
Though not directly addressing Judge Newman’s concerns, the
majority’s ruling seems to imply that the USPTO would have found at
least one of the claims obvious under the lower preponderance-ofevidence standard if it had seen the withheld prior art during its initial
examination.49
Failure to submit physical samples of a prior art product to the
USPTO can also be but-for material. For example, in Worldwide
Home Products, Inc. v. Bed, Bath and Beyond, Inc. the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing the
case and finding that the patent at issue was unenforceable due to
inequitable conduct because the patentee misrepresented a prior art
product and withheld physical samples of the product from the patent
office.50 The omission of the product sample was found to be but-for
material in view of the examiner’s statements in the prosecution
history of the patent.51 During prosecution, Worldwide’s patent
attorney had submitted low-resolution photographs of the prior art
product, which were not clear enough show the claimed features.52
After considering the photographs, the examiner allowed
Worldwide’s patent application, mistakenly stating that the photos did
not show the claimed features.53 The court found the withheld
samples to be but-for material because they embodied the exact
features that the patentee had claimed and the examiner had agreed
were patentable.54
A number of scenarios may be relevant to and raise questions of
fact regarding but-for materiality of a withheld reference or
misleading act. For instance, in Masimo Corp. v. Philips Electric
North America Corp., the patentee failed to disclose a district court’s
claim interpretation that contradicted the patentee’s position in a
reexamination proceeding.55 Specifically, the district court had

48. Id.
49. Am. Calcar, 768 F.3d at 1188-89.
50. Worldwide Home Prod., Inc. v. Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 626, 638
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, Worldwide Home Prod., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 626 F. App’x 1009 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
51. Id. at 630-31.
52. Id. at 629.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 638.
55. Masimo Corp. v. Philips Elec. North Am. Corp., No. cv 09-80-LPS-MPT, 2014 WL
4365191, *4 (D. Del. Sept. 2, 2014).
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construed the claims to require that the claimed calculators actually
determined a particular ratio, but during prosecution the patentee
argued the opposite—that the claimed calculators do not require
calculating the particular ratio.56 While the “broadest reasonable
construction” standard used during reexamination was broader than
the claim construction standard applied during litigation, the court
found the patentee’s failure to disclose the prior claim construction
was sufficient to support a finding of inequitable conduct.57
Lastly, not all omissions or misrepresentations are “but-for”
material, even if they are directly relevant to the claimed inventive
limitation that was in dispute during prosecution. In Novo Nordisk A/S
v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Labs., Ltd., the patentee submitted a
misleading declaration that omitted relevant facts, and the prosecuting
attorney made misleading statements about the declaration.58 The
examiner stated that “[b]ased solely on the [d]eclaration,” the
rejection of certain claims was withdrawn.59 Specifically, the patent
claimed a method of treatment that utilized the synergistic effect of a
combination of two drugs.60 To overcome the examiner’s rejection
that the synergies and combination therapies were well-known in the
art, the applicant submitted an expert declaration regarding results of
the expert’s study of the efficacy of the claimed drug combination in
obese rats.61 The prosecuting attorney asserted that the declaration
showed clear evidence of synergy as well as surprising results of the
two drug combination for treatment of Type II diabetes.62 However,
the patentee and attorney had omitted other remarks by the expert
regarding the fact that the expert’s test results did not necessarily
translate to treatment of Type II diabetes in humans.63 Nonetheless,
the Federal Circuit found that while the omissions and misleading
statements were “troubling,” they were not “but-for” material because
the expert’s test protocols were disclosed to the examiner and the
attorney “employed carefully-chosen language which tracked the
qualified nature” of the expert’s opinion.64

56. Id. at *3-*4.
57. Id. at *2.
58. Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 775 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1022 (E.D.
Mich. 2011).
59. Id. at 1001.
60. Id. at 989.
61. Id. at 1013.
62. Id. at 1006-07.
63. Id. at 1020.
64. Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 719 F.3d 1346, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
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The Therasense court recognized that the doctrine of inequitable
conduct originated from the doctrine of unclean hands. To continue to
deter patentees and applicants from committing bad acts, the Court
created an “egregious misconduct” exception to the requirement of
“but-for” materiality. That is, if the patent defendant shows that the
patent holder committed egregious misconduct during prosecution,
then the defendant need not prove “but-for” materiality because
materiality would be presumed based on the conduct.65
The Federal Circuit applied this exception in Intellect Wireless,
Inc. v. HTC Corp., where an inventor submitted “unmistakably false”
declarations to the USPTO during the prosecution of the patent-atissue and other patents in the same family.66 The applicant submitted
declarations to the USPTO falsely swearing that it had actually
reduced its invention to practice on a specific date when, in fact, it
had not.67 The prosecution attorney “quickly” submitted a revised
declaration in which it purportedly cured the misrepresentation, but
which the court found only “obfuscated the truth” because it never
expressly negated the misrepresentation.68 Consequently, even though
the false declarations where not technically but-for material because
of the revised declarations, the Federal Circuit still affirmed a finding
of inequitable conduct.69 The Court found that the patentee engaged
in “affirmative egregious misconduct,” which rendered the false
declarations material.70
The Court rebuked the patentee for failing to “expressly advise
the PTO of [the misrepresentation’s] existence, stating specifically
wherein it resides.”71 Further, “if the misrepresentation is of one or
more facts, the PTO [must] be advised what the actual facts are.”72
Finally, the applicant must
take the necessary action . . . openly. It does not suffice that
one knowing of misrepresentations in an application or in its
prosecution merely supplies the examiner with accurate facts
without calling his attention to the untrue or misleading
assertions sought to be overcome, leaving him to formulate
65. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292-93 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
66. Intellect Wireless, Inc. v. HTC Corp., 732 F.3d 1339, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1343.
69. Id. at 1346.
70. Id. at 1344.
71. Id. at 1343 (quoting Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1572
(Fed. Cir. 1983)).
72. Intellect Wireless, 732 F.3d.
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his own conclusions.73
The Court concluded that the applicant had not met these
requirements, and “rather than expressly admitting the earlier falsity,
dance[d] around the truth.”74 Intellect Wireless demonstrates that
deceitful misconduct can result in unenforceability of the patent-inquestion, even when but-for materiality is not directly proven.
B. Specific Intent to Deceive After Therasense
The Federal Circuit made clear that Therasense heightened the
standard for proving intent. For example, in 1st Media, LLC v.
Electronic Arts, Inc.,75 the court reiterated that it was not enough to
show “carelessness, lack of attention, poor docketing or crossreferencing or anything else that might be considered negligent or
even grossly negligent.”76 Rather, to sustain a charge of inequitable
conduct, “clear and convincing evidence must show that the applicant
made a deliberate decision to withhold a known material reference.”77
In 1st Media, the named inventor and his attorney withheld from
the USPTO three material references and information about rejections
in two related applications.78 The prosecuting attorney testified that
his usual practice was to provide the USPTO with all relevant prior
art references, and also testified that he did not remember why he did
not disclose one of the prior art references and that his failure to do so
must have been an oversight.79 The district court found the testimony
not to be credible, and thereby inferred the requisite intent to
deceive.80 However, the Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the
evidence was inadequate to sustain the burden because there was no
evidence of a deliberate decision to withhold those references from
the patent office, as required under Therasense.81 In essence, 1st
Media held that even if a withheld reference is material, a court
cannot simply infer intent to deceive, but instead must have actual
evidence of such intent.

73. Id.
74. Id. at 1345.
75. 694 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
76. 1st Media, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 694 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
77. Id. at 1372.
78. Id. at 1369. The original action was filed in the District of Nevada, 1st Media LLC v.
doPi Karaoke, Inc. et al., No. 2:07-cv-01589-JCM-NJK, 2013 WL 1250834 (D. Nev. Mar. 27,
2013).
79. 1st Media, 694 F.3d at 1371.
80. Id. at 1371.
81. Id. at 1376-77.
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Likewise, the lack of evidence of specific intent to deceive in
Hospira, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. compromised the defendant’s ability to
establish inequitable conduct.82 In Hospira, a table in the patent
specification contained erroneous data. 83 The prosecution history
indicated that the examiner relied on the data and the patentee’s
argument based on that data to find the claims allowable, thus making
the error but-for material.84 However, because the inventor could not
recall whether the corrected data had been submitted to his patent
department, the court was unable to find that the applicant had a
specific intent to deceive the USPTO.85 Accordingly, the court
refused to find that patentee committed inequitable conduct.86
Despite the high bar for proving intent, the Federal Circuit has
affirmed several findings of inequitable conduct after Therasense. For
example, in Apotex Inc. v. UCB, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed a
finding of clear and convincing evidence of specific intent to deceive
where the inventor misrepresented the nature of an existing drug
already on the market to the USPTO, withheld relevant prior art, and
misrepresented that he had conducted experiments relevant to the
invention.87 The lower court held that the patent was unenforceable,
opining that the case involved “an orchestrated scheme to deceptively
obtain a patent” and was “illustrative of inventive litigation as
opposed to the scientific discovery that the patent laws were designed
to promote.”88 On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed that there was
clear and convincing evidence that the inventor knowingly omitted
important details regarding the prior art and made knowing
misrepresentations of material facts in order to overcome rejections
from the USPTO, and based on that evidence, affirmed that the single
most reasonable inference was that the inventor had specific intent to
deceive the PTO.89 The inventor’s specific intent to deceive the
USPTO regarding but-for material facts rendered the patent
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.90

82. Hospira, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 09-4591 (MCL), 2012 WL 1587688 (D.N.J. May 4,
2012).
83. Id. at *31.
84. Id. at *31.
85. Id. at *32.
86. Id.
87. 763 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2868 (2015).
88. Apotex Inc. v. UCB, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2013), aff’d, 763
F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
89. Apotex, Inc., 763 F.3d at 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
90. Id. at 1363.
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In TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Properties Co. (Fed. Cir.
2016), the Federal Circuit upheld the lower court finding of
inequitable conduct where the patentee and its in-house counsel
knowingly misrepresented the nature of the prior art.91 During 3M’s
prosecution of the patent-at-issue, the examiner initially allowed all
claims.92 3M then submitted a sample of defendant TransWeb’s prior
art product, which it had received at an expo more than one year
before 3M’s priority filing date.93 In response, the examiner reversed
his position and rejected the claims as obvious in view of TransWeb’s
product.94 3M traversed this rejection by arguing that TransWeb’s
prior art was only available under a confidentiality agreement, and
thus was not prior art, which caused the examiner to withdraw the
rejection.95 However, numerous emails and other evidence showed
that 3M was actually “very much aware” that TransWeb’s product
had been publicly displayed, and that it intentionally chose to
withhold this fact from the examiner in order to overcome rejection.96
Additionally, 3M’s in-house counsel “undertook an intentional
scheme to paper over the potentially prior art nature” of its TransWeb
samples that a 3M collaborator (and later subsidiary) had received
from TransWeb one month after the expo.97 This evidence supported
both the materiality and specific intent prongs of the inequitable
conduct standard under Therasense.98 These cases show that, although
Therasense raised the bar for proving inequitable conduct, patentees
that make clear lies or misrepresentations to the USPTO can still be
punished by the court.

91. TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Properties Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2016) [hereinafter Transweb II]
92. Transweb II, 812 F.3d at 1304.
93. Id. at 1304-05.
94. Id. at 1304.
95. Transweb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Properties Co., 16 F. Supp. 3d 385, 397 (D.N.J.
2014), aff’d, 812 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Transweb I].
96. TransWeb II, 812 F.3d at 1304-06.
97. TransWeb I, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 401-03.
98. TransWeb I, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 397-98.
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C. State of the Law Just Before Regeneron
In the months leading up to Regeneron, courts continued to
apply the heightened Therasense standard and continued to look for
evidence of specific intent to deceive the USPTO during the
prosecution of disputed patents.
For example, in Asghari-Kamrani v. United Services Automobile
Association, the district court refused to find specific intent to deceive
when there were plausible alternative explanations for the alleged
misconduct.99 The patent owner in Asghari-Kamrani claimed
continuation priority within a patent family, thereby avoiding
rejections based on disclosures in its earlier-filed patent
applications.100 During litigation, evidence showed that the patents
were continuations-in-part rather than continuations as claimed on the
applications and the face of the issued patents.101 However, multiple
witnesses testified that the patent owner had hired a series of different
patent counsel to draft and file the applications of the patent family
due to cost concerns, and that the misstatement of priority may have
been inadvertent.102 The district court refused to find inequitable
conduct because, “where a plausible alternative explanation that does
not go to inequitable conduct also exists, a court cannot find a specific
intent to deceive.”103
Similarly, in Barry v. Medtronic, Inc., the district court did not
find a specific intent to deceive where there were multiple reasonable
explanations for why the patentee failed to correct a mistake during
prosecution.104 The defendant in Barry alleged inequitable conduct in
part based on the fact that the patent holder submitted an inaccurate
figure and withheld more accurate figures of the invention.105 The
court found no specific intent to deceive and, as a result, no
inequitable conduct.106 Specifically, the evidence showed that the
patent applicants had images that supported the invention and that
they could have submitted at the time of prosecution and did submit
those corrected images when they discovered the error.107 Of a
number of reasonable inferences that could be drawn to explain the
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

252 F. Supp. 3d 562, 586 (E.D. Va. 2017).
Id. at 575.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 581.
Id.
245 F. Supp. 3d 793, 806 (E.D. Tex. 2017).
Id. at 804-05.
Id. at 805.
Id.
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patentee’s submission of the wrong figure, the court found intent to
deceive the USPTO less plausible than other explanations.108
Courts have also required clear and convincing evidence of
specific intent to deceive the USPTO when the charge of inequitable
conduct is based on actions by the patentee during inter partes review
proceedings. For example, in UUSI, LLC v. United States, the
defendant argued that the patent owner had committed egregious
misconduct during the prosecution of the patent by misrepresenting
the expiration date of two patent claims during the institution stage of
an inter partes review of the patent.109 In the inter partes review, the
difference in expiration dates may have impacted whether the claims
were construed more narrowly under Phillips standard if the claims
were expired or under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard
if the claims had not expired.110 However, the patent owner’s actions
“lacked the requisite indicia of fraud or unmistakable falsehood”
required to show affirmative egregious misconduct.111 The court
concluded that
[a]n erroneous and ill-conceived argument about the
expiration date of two patent claims, fully aired before the
PTAB and rejected by that tribunal, is a far cry from the type
of misconduct courts have found to be inherently egregious
such as perjury, bribery or manufacturing evidence.112
Because the defendant did not otherwise show “but-for” materiality,
the court dismissed the defendant’s inequitable conduct claims.113
UUSI shows that even misconduct during the litigation-like inter
partes review is judged under the same standards as in Therasense.
Critically, the misconduct in UUSI was not used to infer specific
intent to deceive the USPTO for purposes of showing inequitable
conduct.
III.

REGENERON AND THE POTENTIAL RETREAT FROM
THERASENSE

A. The Regeneron District Court Decision
In March 2014, Regeneron sued Merus for infringing U.S. Patent
Number 8,502,018 (the ’018 patent), which relates to targeting and
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 805-06.
UUSI, LLC v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 263 (2017).
Id. at 271-72.
Id. at 270-71.
Id.
Id. at 273.
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modifying endogenous genes and chromosomal loci in eukaryotic
cells.114 Only claim 1 of the patent was at issue, which recited “[a]
genetically modified mouse, comprising in its germline human
rearranged variable region gene segments inserted at an endogenous
mouse immunoglobulin locus.”115 In essence, the patent claims a
particular kind of genetically modified mouse used for scientific
research, which allows users to “target and modify specific genes in
mice so that the mice develop antibodies that can be used by
humans.”116
Merus asserted that the patent was unenforceable due to
inequitable conduct, in that Regeneron’s patent attorneys intentionally
withheld four references (Brüggemann, Wood, Taki, and Zou) from
the PTO during prosecution of the ’018 patent that were material to
patentability.117 Regeneron did not dispute that it knew of the
references, or that it failed to disclose them, but rather argued that the
references “were not but-for material, that they were cumulative of
references the PTO actually relied on during prosecution, and that [it]
did not have any specific intent to deceive the PTO.”118 A third-party
cited these references during prosecution of a related application after
Regeneron received a Notice of Allowance for the ’018 patent.119
Regeneron did not submit these references in the application that
became the ’018 patent, but did in all other related applications that
were pending.120 The district court also noted a purported irregularity
in prosecution of the ’018 patent, where Regeneron’s counsel made
representations that a transgenic mouse had been produced in
accordance with the claims, and yielded surprising results.121 In fact,
the evidence was “overwhelming” that no such mouse existed at the
time the application was filed.122 Before even addressing application
of an adverse inference, the court found “by clear and convincing
evidence, and without need for application of an adverse inference,
that Regeneron made false and misleading statements” and found “by

114. Regeneron I, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 530; see also U.S. Patent No. 8,502,018, at col.1
ll.17-33 (filed Jun. 20, 2011).
115. Id. at col. 29 ll. 24-26.
116. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1347.
117. Regeneron I, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 571.
118. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1346.
119. Id. at 1349.
120. Id. at 1350.
121. Id. at 1349.
122. Regeneron I, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 584.
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clear and convincing evidence that this constitutes egregious
affirmative misconduct.”123
However, the court decided to address Regeneron’s
“questionable conduct” and numerous “shenanigans” in light of
Regeneron’s pattern of, among other things, choosing “tactics over
substance.”124 It was Regeneron’s sword and shield use of attorneyclient privilege, asserting and waiving the privilege when most
beneficial, that inspired the court to issue sanctions.125 Regeneron
asserted the privilege during discovery to shield documents relating to
the patent’s prosecution, making it more difficult for Merus to prove
its inequitable conduct defense, and then tried to “have it both ways at
trial” by submitting the same info contained in those documents in the
form of witness affidavits when it strongly supported their position at
trial.126 In fact, the court’s in camera review of Regeneron’s
privileged log revealed a “Pandora’s Box” of serious discovery
issues, including numerous non-privileged documents related to
topics at issue throughout the litigation withheld on the basis of
privilege, and other documents that should have been produced
pursuant to an earlier order from the court.127 Due to the extent and
depth of Regeneron’s pattern of misconduct, the court felt that
ordinary sanctions (such as striking the affidavits and precluding the
witness testimony) would not suffice to remedy the many broad
issues that had spread throughout the case.128 Instead, after carefully
considering the issue, the court determined that the appropriate
remedy for the litigation conduct was to draw an adverse inference of
a specific intent to deceive the USPTO, and thereby found that
Regeneron had engaged in inequitable conduct in connection with
prosecution of the ’018 Patent.129
B. The Regeneron Federal Circuit Opinion
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision, and held that it had not abused its discretion under regional
circuit law by imposing an adverse inference of specific intent to
deceive because of, among other things, litigation misconduct during
efforts to enforce the ’018 patent.130 The court addressed both
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 585.
Id. at 585-86.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 589-93.
Id. at 530, 594.
Regeneron I, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 595.
Id. at 595-96.
Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1364.
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materiality and intent, finding that Regeneron’s litigation misconduct
was properly used to infer inequitable conduct, rendering the ’018
patent unenforceable.131
1. Materiality
On appeal, Regeneron argued that none of the withheld
references were but-for material to the prosecution of the ’018 patent,
and that the District Court had therefore erred in finding otherwise.132
The Federal Circuit, however, disagreed. Following Therasense, it
defined the materiality required to establish inequitable conduct as
“but-for materiality,” and emphasized that an alleged infringer can
show but-for materiality “if the PTO would not have allowed a claim
had it been aware of the undisclosed prior art.”133 To determine
materiality, the Court reiterated, a court “place[s] itself in the shoes of
a patent examiner” and therefore “applies the preponderance of the
evidence standard and gives the claims their broadest reasonable
construction.”134 After addressing each of the four withheld
references, the Circuit agreed with the District Court and found that it
did not clearly err in finding the references but-for material and not
cumulative, and that “had the reference(s) been before the examiner at
the time,” the claims of the ’018 patent would not have been allowed
to issue.135
Recall that the four withheld references were Brüggemann,
Wood, Taki, and Zou.136 Regeneron argued that the Brüggemann
reference was not but-for material because, according to its narrow
construction, it did “not disclose a reverse-chimeric mouse.”137
However, since the Circuit did not adopt Regeneron’s narrow
construction, and instead did not limit the construction of Claim 1 to
only reverse-chimeric mice, it found that the District Court did not
clearly err in finding the reference but-for material. 138 As to the other
three withheld references, the Court reviewed the references
themselves, the testimony of Merus’ expert witnesses, and the finding
of the lower court before ultimately concluding that “the references
both individually and in combination teach one of skill in the art to
131. Id. at 1364.
132. Id. at 1352.
133. Id. at 1350 (quoting Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276,
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1353-56.
136. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1353.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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genetically modify mice by inserting exogenous, including human,
variable region gene segments endogenously into a mouse
immunoglobulin locus.”139 The Circuit also found two of the withheld
references (Taki and Zou) but-for material at least partially because
they provided “the motivation to combine these references to develop
the genetically modified mouse.”140
Regeneron also argued that even if the withheld references were
but-for material, at least three of those references (Brüggemann, Taki,
and Zou) were cumulative of others considered by the Examiner
during the ’018 patent’s prosecution.141 Importantly, if a reference is
merely cumulative, the reference cannot be but-for material.142 A
patent owner can show that a reference is cumulative if the reference
“teaches no more than what a reasonable examiner would consider to
be taught by the prior art already before the PTO.”143 After
considering each of the three potentially cumulative References, the
Court found that they were in fact not cumulative, and therefore did
not preclude the District Court’s finding of materiality.144
2. Intent to Deceive
In response to Merus’ counterclaim of unenforceability due to
inequitable conduct against Regeneron, the District Court indicated it
would bifurcate the trial based on the two elements of the claim,
conducting one bench trial focused on the element of materiality, and
another focused on intent.145 However, the court only finished the first
bench trial regarding materiality—it never held the second bench trail
to address the Regeneron’s specific intent.146 Instead, after the first
bench trial, the District Court extensively discussed Regeneron’s
discovery misconduct occurring throughout litigation, and as a
sanction for this misconduct, drew an adverse inference of specific
intent to deceive the USPTO.147 The Federal Circuit agreed that the
District Court was within its broad discretion to “fashion[] an
appropriate sanction, including the discretion to . . . proceed with a
139. Id. at 1354-55.
140. Id. at 1355.
141. Id. (arguing that Brüggemann was cumulative of U.S. Patent No. 6,114,598 to Raju
Kucherlapati [“Kucherlapati”], Wood was cumulative of U.S. Application No. 11/009,873 to
Nils Lonberg et al. [“Lonberg”] and Taki was cumulative of both Kucherlapati and Lonberg).
142. Dig. Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
143. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
144. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1355-56.
145. Regeneron I, 144 F. Supp. 3d 530, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
146. See id.
147. Regeneron I, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 595.
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trial and give an adverse inference instruction . . . [when] sanctioning
parties for violating discovery obligations.”148 Therefore, it found that
the lower court’s decision to forego the second part of the bifurcated
trial on inequitable conduct, and to draw an adverse inference of
intent to deceive, was not an abuse of discretion.149
On appeal, Regeneron did not “meaningfully dispute any of the
factual findings underlying the district court’s decision.”150 As
previously discussed, those findings included improperly withholding
and citing on privilege logs documents clearly not privileged (such as
experimental data), withholding as privileged information where the
privilege had been waived, and withholding evidence of patent
prosecution counsels’ reasoning and state of mind relevant to whether
counsel had an intent to deceive.151 Regeneron did not dispute that it
had engaged in this litigation misconduct, but rather asserted that the
court’s imposed sanction was an abuse of discretion, amounting to not
merely a sanction but rather to a finding of unenforceability, or even a
dismissal.152 The Federal Circuit disagreed, and emphasized that the
“widespread litigation misconduct” was tied directly to evidence
relevant to the intent inquiry.153 It noted that the litigation misconduct
directly affected the ability of both Merus and the court to determine
Regeneron’s intent with respect to the withheld references, and also
clarified that the sanction imposed only established the element of
intent, and “[o]nly after Merus proved the remaining elements of
inequitable conduct did the district court hold the patent
unenforceable.”154
Ultimately, Regeneron should likely be read to demonstrate that
district courts have broad discretion in awarding adverse inferences
based on litigation misconduct, so long as the litigation misconduct
relates to the underlying inequitable conduct inquiry. However, such a
reading is also clearly in tension with Therasense.
3. Judge Newman’s Dissent
Judge Newman penned a strong dissent, based on her belief that
her “colleagues appl[ied] incorrect law and add[ed] confusion to
148. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1363.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1356.
151. Id. at 1356-63.
152. Id. at 1363.
153. Id. at 1364 (In addition to the “widespread litigation misconduct,” “Regeneron is
accused not only of post-prosecution misconduct but also of engaging in inequitable conduct
during prosecution.”).
154. Id.
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precedent.”155 Newman interpreted Therasense to teach that intent to
deceive cannot be inferred, but must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.156 She pointed out that there was “ no
evidentiary record developed on intent to deceive, with no testimony
and no opportunity for examination and cross-examination of
witnesses.”157 In her view, the majority merely “engage[d] in
innuendo based on its careful selections from documents not admitted
into evidence . . . thus convict[ing] Regeneron, its counsel, and its
scientists, with no trial, no evidence, and no opportunity to respond in
their defense.”158 However, the majority emphasized that direct
evidence of intent was not required, and that intent may be inferred
“where the applicant engages in a ‘a pattern of lack of candor,’
including where the applicant repeatedly makes factual
representations ‘contrary to the true information he had in his
possession.’”159
Judge Newman also disagreed with the majority on the
materiality of the references, believing that neither the district court
nor the majority had established that the references led to
unpatentability. Instead, the district court stated, and she agreed, that
the references disclosed only “motivations, benefits, and cumulative
teachings.”160 However, in Judge Newman’s view, this still did not
amount to but-for materiality, “whether taken alone, or with the cited
references.”161
4. The Regeneron Majority Versus Dissent on Aptix
Decision
Judge Newman based her dissent largely on the Court’s prior
decision in Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc.162 In her
view, Aptix instructed that “litigation misconduct in the infringement
suit ‘does not infect, or even affect’ the patent right” and that the
majority erred in “‘infecting’ its analysis of inequitable conduct with
counsel’s purported litigation misconduct years later in the
infringement trial.”163 However, the majority found that in the case at
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
1375).

Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1365 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1351 (citing Apotex Inc. v. UCB, Inc., 763 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
Id. At 1396.
Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1369 (Newman, J., dissenting).
See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc., 269 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1367 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting Aptix, 269 F.3d at
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hand, Aptix was inapposite.164 In that case, Aptix submitted falsified
engineering notebooks to the court during litigation, and there was
absolutely no evidence of misconduct in the patent’s prosecution, or
that the company participated in any wrongful conduct during
litigation or before the PTO.165 Where the district court erred was in
declaring the patent unenforceable as a form of relief solely for the
litigation misconduct, which it felt “necessary for deterring Aptix and
other parties from engaging in future misconduct.”166 The Circuit
Court emphasized the flexibility of the unclean hands doctrine, upon
which the inequitable conduct defense is based, declaring that “[t]here
is no limit inherent in the doctrine of unclean hands that prevents
declaring a patent unenforceable based on the post-issuance conduct
of the party seeking relief.”167 However, despite the doctrine’s
flexibility, the Court found that it “does not reach out to extinguish a
property right based on misconduct during litigation to enforce the
right.”168
The Aptix court skipped past an inequitable conduct analysis,
moving straight to a declaration of unenforceability as a sanction for
the solely post-prosecution litigation misconduct.169 Unlike Aptix,
there was evidence that Regeneron had engaged in both pre-and-postprosecution misconduct, which led the district court to draw its
adverse inference based on both types of misconduct.170 In the
majority’s view, the district court’s sanction was not, as in Aptix,
punishing Regeneron by holding the patent unenforceable, but instead
only that an element of the inequitable conduct defense was
established. The unenforceability of the ’018 patent was not found
until after Merus proved the remaining elements of inequitable
conduct.171
The dissent appears to have equated the ultimate holding in the
case with the sanction imposed for Regeneron’s litigation misconduct.
While the adverse inference sanction did ultimately affect the final
decision of the court on the issue of enforceability, allowing Merus to
meet its burden to prove inequitable conduct, the sanction itself was
164. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1364.
165. Aptix, 269 F.3d at 1371, 1377.
166. Id. at 1377-78.
167. Id. at 1379-80.
168. Aptix, 269 F.3d at 1375.
169. See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., No. 98-00762, 2000 WL 852813, at
*32 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2000), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 269 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
170. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1364 (“Regeneron is accused not only of post-prosecution
misconduct but also of engaging in inequitable conduct during prosecution.”).
171. Id.
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not non-enforceability. Therefore, it seems that the majority properly
distinguished Aptix since the actions of the parties and the remedy
declared by the court was different than that of the case at hand.
IV.

THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF REGENERON AT DISTRICT
COURT

As of February 2018, only two district court cases have cited to
the Regeneron decision for the proposition that courts may draw an
adverse inference regarding the prosecution and scope of a patent
based on misconduct during litigation. Because neither case reached a
conclusion regarding whether the patents at issue were unenforceable
for inequitable conduct, neither case demonstrates a significant
departure from the law prior to Regeneron. Although there are a
limited number of cases that have come out in this area since
Regeneron, it appears that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Regeneron
has emboldened more courts to consider a wider range of misconduct
to draw adverse inferences regarding inequitable conduct to limit or
terminate patent rights.
The first district court decision that cited Regeneron relied on its
precedent to support an inference of specific intent for failing to
disclose relevant prior art during prosecution. In Shuffle Tech
International LLC v. Sci. Games Corp., the patent owner Scientific
Games moved for summary judgment contending, among other
things, that no reasonable juror could infer that the original patentee
had specific intent to defraud the PTO during the prosecution of the
disputed patent.172 Shuffle Tech alleged that the original patent owner
had committed inequitable conduct by failing to disclose relevant
pieces of prior art during the prosecutions and reexaminations of two
of its patents.173 Shuffle Tech further alleged that Scientific Games
violated antitrust laws under Walker Process, by utilizing a patent
obtained through intentional fraud on the USPTO to create or
preserve a monopoly.174 To establish of the original patent owner’s
intent to defraud the USPTO, Shuffle Tech presented evidence that
the patent owner had made contradictory statements during
prosecution of the patent. The court found this evidenced that the
patent owner had a “lack of candor” and knowingly misrepresented
the state of the prior art to the PTO. Citing Regeneron for authority,
172. Shuffle Tech Int’l LLC v. Sci. Games Corp., No. 1:15-cv-3702, 2017 WL 3838096,
at *1-*2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2017).
173. Id. at *2.
174. Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 179-80
(1965).
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the court then drew an adverse inference of fraudulent intent.175 The
court found that Shuffle Tech had provided sufficient evidence to
support a finding that SHFL acted with fraudulent intent in omitting
the withheld references at issue, and that a reasonable jury could infer
from that “lack of candor” that the omission was for the purpose of
defrauding the PTO.176 While Shuffle Tech is unlike Regeneron in that
the patent owner’s misconduct was before the USPTO and there was
no evidence of litigation misconduct, it is notable that the court cited
Regeneron to support drawing an adverse inference, which appears to
be directly contrary to the primary holding of the Federal Circuit in
Therasense.
The second district court decision case that citied Regeneron did
so to support the proposition that mere discovery disputes during
litigation could be used to infer specific intent. In Supernus
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. TWi Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the plaintiff
alleged that TWi’s generic drug product would infringe Supernus’
patents.177 Supernus sought discovery regarding TWi’s selection of a
particular drug ingredient. While TWi argued that the ingredient was
selected for routine reasons, it also invoked attorney-client privilege
to protect information regarding TWi’s selection of the ingredient
from discovery. The parties submitted briefing as to whether the
Court should draw an adverse inference from TWi’s invocation of the
attorney-client privilege. Citing Regeneron for support, the court
stated that it was “tempted” to draw an adverse inference from
“TWi’s caginess on the issue” and TWi’s use of privilege as a sword
and shield. However, the court ultimately declined to draw an adverse
inference because there was other “ample evidence” establishing why
TWi chose to use the ingredient in its generic drug.178
V.

THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF REGENERON: TIPS FOR
PRACTITIONERS

While the Regeneron decision did not explicitly change the
standard for inequitable conduct, it appears to have created a new way
for defendants to prove the elements of the affirmative defense.
Because the Regeneron decision implicated both the patent
prosecution counsel and litigation counsel in its finding, prosecutors
and litigators should each consider taking precautionary measures to
175. Shuffle Tech, 2017 WL 3838096, at *13.
176. Id. at *14.
177. Supernus Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharm., Inc., 265 F. Supp. 3d 490, 490 (D.N.J. Sept.
21, 2017).
178. Id. at *20 (quoting Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1364-65).
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avoid future claims of inequitable conduct. The following tips and
considerations can help attorneys guard against new claims of
inequitable conduct spurred by Regeneron.
A. Disclosures During Prosecution
Having open and honest communications with the USPTO
during prosecution is fundamental to avoiding a finding of inequitable
conduct. As discussed in greater depth above, prosecutors should be
careful to avoid understating the relevance or importance of prior art
before the USPTO. By broadening the adverse inference analysis,
Regeneron may encourage some defendants to rely on arguments that
the prosecuting attorney mischaracterized prior art during the
prosecution of the asserted patent. To avoid these types of assertions,
prosecutors may want to adopt an overly candid approach in making
assertions and disclosures to the USPTO, erring on the side of overdisclosure and literal accuracy when characterizing prior art. Creating
a clear record of good faith efforts to disclose accurate information
during the patent prosecution process is also important. As discussed
in further detail below, the same guiding principles hold true for
litigation counsel.
As discussed previously, all persons substantively involved in
the prosecution of a patent application, including both the inventors
and their attorneys, owe a duty of candor to the USPTO to disclose
“all information known . . . to be material to patentability.”179
However, as we have seen in the cases discussed above, what defines
“known” and “material to patentability” is often subjective and rarely
clear. Too often prosecutors fail to submit thorough Information
Disclosure Statements (IDSs) during prosecution, which makes the
resulting issued patents more vulnerable to inequitable conduct claims
and arguments that the patent is unenforceable. When determining
which references to submit in an IDS, applicants must balance
numerous strategic concerns regarding administrative burdens and
internal costs, as well as concerns regarding possible future litigation
risks. While failure to disclose material art may lead to claims that the
applicant hid important art, disclosing an overly long list including
possibly irrelevant references could lead to claims that the applicant
intentionally buried important references in a long list.
179. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (“Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office . . . . [All
persons involved in the patent application owe] a duty to disclose to the Office all information
known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this section.”); 37 C.F.R. §
1.97; MPEP § 609.04(a) (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018).
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Hypothetically, applicants should endeavor to disclose all reasonably
relevant references that are not cumulative. However, determining
what a patent examiner would consider cumulative is challenging,
and failing to disclose a reference that is clearly cumulative is likely
to be seized upon by litigation counsel as evidence of inequitable
conduct. Because claims of burying are less common and harder to
prove than claims of hiding, and additionally because claims are
construed to have their broadest reasonable interpretation during
prosecution, applicants should err on the side of disclosure if a
reference is arguably relevant, even if it appears to be cumulative.180
Note that intent is critical to the inequitable conduct analysis, and an
applicant should not submit irrelevant or cumulative art with the
intent to bury relevant references.
Patent applicants should also pay close attention to references
cited by foreign patent offices during the prosecution of any related
foreign applications.181 Disclosure of these references will support
later claims that the applicant made good faith efforts to comply with
their duty of candor and therefore did not intend to deceive the
USPTO. Additionally, when citing non-English references in IDS,
applicants should provide an English translation of at least the most
material parts of the foreign reference to aid examiners.182 Ideally, the
best practice would be to provide a translation of the entire reference
to avoid charges that the partial translation was an effort to mislead
the examiner by pointing them away from relevant untranslated
portions. However, due to the high costs associated with the
translation of technical documents, a full translation is often not
economically feasible.
Complying with the duty of disclosure can be a burdensome task
for applicants, particularly where foreign counterparts or pending
domestic family members necessitate numerous IDS filings.
Nonetheless, thorough and accurate information disclosure aids the
180. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“When a reference
was before the examiner, whether through the examiner's search or the applicant's disclosure, it
cannot be deemed to have been withheld from the examiner.”) (citing Scripps Clinic & Research
Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991)); Boehringer Ingelheim
Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 68 F. Supp. 2d 508, 547 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding that
defendant could not show deceptive intent to support its claim that the patent owner buried
material information by not highlighting the most relevant portions in its submission to the
USPTO); Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1350.
181. MPEP § 2001.06(a); 37 C.F.R. § 1.97-1.98.
182. Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2000), amended (Apr. 5, 2000) (affirming that the patent applicant intended to deceive the
USPTO by presenting a partial translation of a foreign reference that omitted translations of the
most material disclosures of the foreign reference).
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USPTO’s examination of the application and can ultimately add
substantial value to the patent. Patent examiners are allotted very little
time for their prior art searches, and thus clear and accurate
disclosures by applicants help the examiners analyze the state of the
art in a more complete and timely manner. Extensive disclosure
benefits the applicant because all references properly cited to the
examiner are listed on the face of the issued patent and are presumed
to have been reviewed by the examiner.183 If the patent is litigated,
courts and juries give considerable deference to the patent office,
making it difficult to invalidate the patent over the listed prior art.
Consequently, patents with thorough disclosures of prior art are also
more valuable for sale and licensing because knowledgeable buyers
and licensees recognize that full disclosure during prosecution
process tends to support the presumption of validity of the patent.
When preparing Information Disclosure Statements, it is
essential that practitioners have systems in place to ensure that all
relevant references (prior art or otherwise) are considered for
disclosure. To avoid any appearance of impropriety, careful planning
prior to submitting the IDS will help to protect the client and
practitioner against claims of inequitable conduct. For most clients,
time and money are exceedingly important, which may dictate filing
strategies that reduce these burdens. For example, when prosecution a
group of related patent applications (for example, a group of
application claiming priority to a common parent), it may be
advisable to file consolidated IDSs at periodic intervals citing art that
is relevant to each member of the group. Doing so may allow the
applicant to cross-cite all relevant information without spending more
than necessary to file IDS forms.
Finally, note that the applicant’s disclosure obligations continue
throughout the prosecution of the patent application. Thus, applicants
should consider continually submitting IDSs to disclose additional
relevant and non-cumulative prior art discovered during the
prosecution of foreign patent applications, international patent
searches, or any other search or analysis conducted during the
pendency of a patent application.
B. Post-Allowance Disclosures
Upon receipt of a Notice of Allowance, an applicant should
review the application and file history to confirm that all potentially
relevant documents were disclosed in IDSs, and that the examiner
183.

MPEP § 609.06.
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considered all cited references in those IDSs. To ensure a clear record
that the examiner considered all of the documents disclosed in the
IDS, the applicant should verify that the examiner initialed all prior
art cited in the IDS filings. If not, it may be appropriate to contact the
examiner and request that an initialed IDS be issued and included in
the file history. Although an issued patent is presumptively valid, that
presumption is strengthened by evidence that the examiner considered
all relevant prior art references cited during the prosecution of the
patent. Furthermore, should a defendant attempt to assert a cited prior
art reference against the patent during litigation, the court and jury
will likely give substantial deference to the USPTO’s determination
that the patent was valid over the cited art.
The applicant’s duty to disclose all potentially relevant
documents continues until the day the patent issues. 184 Therefore, if
an applicant becomes aware of potentially relevant documents at any
time prior to the issuance of the patent, the applicant must submit
those documents to the PTO in an IDS. This scenario of accidental
nondisclosure most often occurs when a patent is examined quickly
and the Notice of Allowance arrives before the applicant submitted all
of the relevant documents for the IDS to the USPTO. Thus, postallowance review should include careful consideration of all
submitted IDSs and prior art known to the applicant. This cautious
review and submission process may prevent the expense of litigation
against allegations of inequitable conduct for failing to disclose
known material references. Addition of prior art references to the
prosecution history also gives applicants the opportunity to record in
the prosecution history arguments showing validity of the patent over
disclosed references and/or amend claims to ensure validity over the
disclosed art.
Note, however, the receipt of a Notice of Allowance officially
closes prosecution of the patent application, and IDSs filed after the
Notice of Allowance may not be considered by the Examiner. As
such, if the applicant realizes that not all potentially relevant
documents have been submitted to the PTO, the applicant can file an
IDS with a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) to reopen
prosecution and have the documents considered. However, if the
applicant has already paid the issue fee for the allowed application,
then the applicant may need to file a petition to withdraw the
application from issuance and then file a supplemental IDS for the
examiner’s consideration. In both cases, reopening prosecution and
submitting the IDS will likely substantially delay the ultimate
184.

37 C.F.R § 1.97.
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issuance of the patent. Thus, patent applicants should weigh the
possibility of delay against the relevance and importance of the newly
disclosed reference. As another alternative, the USPTO has
implemented a Quick Path IDS (QPIDS) pilot program which
eliminates the requirement that an applicant file a Request for
Continued Examination (RCE) in order to add an information
disclosure statement (IDS). Under the QPIDS pilot program, the
USPTO will issue a corrected notice of allowability instead of
reopening prosecution if the examiner determines that no information
in the newly submitted IDS necessitates further prosecution of the
patent application.185
Note that if the patent issues and patentee discovers that a person
associated with the prosecution of the patent knew of materially
relevant information during the pendency of the application and failed
to disclose it to the USPTO, the patentee may want to consider filing
a request for supplemental examination, which is referred to as ex
parte reexamination.186 In order to ensure a clear record of good faith
and compliance, an applicant can request the USPTO to conduct the
supplemental examination of the patent to correct, reconsider, or
consider information that may be relevant to the patent in question.
During the reexamination process, the USPTO may confirm the
validity of patent claims over newly disclosed prior art or the patent
holder can amend claims as necessary to overcome the newly
disclosed prior art. Because reexamination is often complete within a
year, it may even be used to change the scope of claims for a patent
that is currently being asserted, resulting in a reissued patent with new
claims in the middle of litigation. When reissue of a patent changes
the scope of the claims, parties that practiced or prepared to practice
the claims prior to reissue may have intervening rights to continue
practicing the patent claims. But any information considered during
the supplemental examination would be added to the record of
information that was submitted and considered during the prosecution
of the patent, and the supplemental examination would thus eliminate
a defendant’s ability to claim in a future infringement litigation that
the applicant hid the information from the USPTO. Thus, even if the
patentee believes the reference was merely cumulative, reexamination
185. 77 Fed. Reg. 27443 (May 10, 2012). All compliant requests for consideration of an
information disclosure statement under the QPIDS pilot program filed on or before September
30, 2018, will be considered.
186. See 35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (“A patent owner may request supplemental examination of a
patent in the Office to consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant to the
patent, in accordance with such requirements as the Director may establish.”); see also MPEP §
2802.
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proceedings may help avoid inequitable conduct allegations by
creating a record clarifying that previously-known art is not
material.187
Finally, if the patent holder becomes aware of a material
reference after issuance of the patent, while there is no duty to
disclose at this point, the patentee still has the option of submitting a
request for supplemental examination in order to create a record that
the USPTO considered the prior art and nevertheless still found the
claims valid.
C. Pre-Litigation Diligence
Although Regeneron may change the way courts remedy
misconduct after a finding of inequitable conduct, the basic
Therasense two-prong framework has not changed and the party
asserting the defense still must show both materiality and intent.
The “but-for” materiality standard for inequitable conduct asks
courts to analyze whether prior art would have prevented the issuance
of the patent from the USPTO. Thus, the “broadest reasonable
interpretation” claim construction standard used during prosecution at
the USPTO is applied for this analysis. As such, a patent holder’s
litigation counsel cannot count on a narrow claim construction to
rebut but-for materiality of a reference.
While litigation counsel cannot turn back time and change what
occurred before the USPTO during prosecution, they can take steps to
avoid adverse inferences based on their own conduct during the
litigation. Again, honesty with the court as well as opposing counsel
in discovery and all other stages of litigation is the best rule of thumb
to avoid “intent” accusations. As seen in Regeneron, misuse of
attorney/client privilege and confidentiality claims can negatively
impact the litigation and render the asserted patent completely
unenforceable.
Prior to asserting a patent, a patent holder’s litigation counsel
should aim to have a clear and complete understanding of all
prosecution history for the patent-at-issue. Careful review of
communications between the patent holder and its prosecution
counsel should be a critical part of the pre-litigation investigation.
Litigation counsel should investigate nonprivileged communications
and documents that could be interpreted as showing deceptive intent
and weigh when and how to disclose these documents to the court and
187. Unless the patent holder intentionally misleads the USPTO during the reexamination
process, as the Federal Circuit found in Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 768 F.3d
1185, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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the opposing party. As Regeneron demonstrated, unreasonable
attempts to hide these types of documents can be construed as
misconduct and result in severe consequences even if the alleged
misconduct has little to do with the prosecution process before the
USPTO.
D. Strategic Assertion
There are obvious benefits to litigating patent disputes that arise
over patents that were prosecuted by the same firm including an
expertise in the particular patent and its subject matter, knowledge of
the background conception and reduction to practice of the invention,
and knowledge and records of the prosecution history of the patent.
However, acting as both litigation and prosecution counsel for the
same patent holder regarding the same patent may also cause genuine
or perceived conflicts of interest issues, complex privilege issues,
and/or toll malpractice claims against the patent prosecution counsel.
For instance, to the extent that a defendant’s inequitable conduct
claims raise issues of misconduct or legal ethics violations by the
patent prosecutor, litigation counsel may in certain circumstances be
faced with choosing to defend a colleague, the patent prosecutor, or a
client, the patent holder. With respect to privilege, it may be difficult
to draw the line between litigation privilege and patent prosecution
privilege, such that waiver of privilege on one matter may be
construed to waive privilege on the other. Additionally, from a
practical perspective, it may be difficult to sift through documents to
identify which are subject to which privilege. Lastly, if a patent
holder believes its patent prosecution counsel committed malpractice,
under the “continuous representation doctrine,” the statute of
limitations on the legal malpractice claim is tolled while the firm
continues to represent the patent holder, e.g., during the litigation. If
the patent holder wishes to later bring such a malpractice action
against the attorney or firm based on the inequitable conduct,
depending on the particular state’s law, this can mean that even if the
limitations period would have run, estopping the client from bringing
the claim, the tolling will allow the claim.188
Litigation counsel should carefully consider these issues before
asserting a patent prosecuted by its firm.

188. For a recent case applying this doctrine, resulting in a $17 million judgment being
upheld against a firm (though not in the patent context), see Red Zone LLC v. Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft, LLP, 988 N.Y.S.2d 588, 588 (N.Y. App. Div. June 19, 2014).
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CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s ruling in Regeneron seems to demonstrate
that litigation misconduct may be relevant to the intent analysis, at
least when the misconduct is closely related to the patent prosecutors’
work. In doing so, the decision opens new opportunities for
defendants asserting inequitable conduct defenses to challenge the
litigation conduct of the patentee or its counsel. While the court
considered Regeneron’s litigation misconduct egregious, the
circumstances that gave rise to it are not uncommon in practice. In
fact, disputes over the proper scope or waiver of attorney-client
privilege are inherent to inequitable conduct proceedings, which
squarely place attorney-client communications and attorney mental
impressions at issue. By holding that district courts have discretion to
grant dispositive adverse inferences based on erroneous claims of
privilege or untimely waivers of privilege, Regeneron invites
defendants to transform disputes over privilege into affirmative
arguments in support of an inequitable conduct defense.
While it seems unlikely that the frequency of the inequitable
conduct defense will rise to its former plague-like levels, Regeneron
may still have a significant impact in patent litigation, perhaps
providing a new shield for defendants to use against unscrupulous or
overly combative plaintiffs.

